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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : 
vs. : 
ARTHUR RIBE, : Argument Priority 
: Classification Number 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Appeal of a final Order of the Trial Court denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the police complied 
with Section 77-23-10 by announcing their presence only? 
POINT II 
Did the Trial Court apply the appropriate legal standard in 
determining whether the police had complied with Utah's statutory 
knock and announce requirements? 
POINT III 
Did the Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[w]e review the Findings of Fact supporting a trial Court's 
decision on a Motion to Suppress under a clearly erroneous 
standard", State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Ut. App. 1990), but 
we reviewed the ultimate conclusions drawn from those findings as 
a matter of law, under a correction of error standard, affording no 
deference to the trial Court. State v. Taylor, 169 U.A.R. 62 (Ut. 
App. 1991). MIn assessing the trial Court's legal conclusions 
based upon its factual findings, we afford it no deference but 
apply a 'correction of error' standard". State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 327 (Ut. App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following Constitutional and Statutory provisions which 
are applicable to this Appeal are: 
a. Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
which reads in relevant part: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized". 
b. Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution which 
provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no Warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized". 
c. Section 77-23-10 Utah Code Annotated which reads in 
relevant part: 
"When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building . . . the 
officer executing the warrant may use such 
force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority and 
purpose, there is no response or he is not 
admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) . . . the magistrate . . . directs 
the officer need not give notice. . . ." 
d. The Fifth Amendment to the United State Constitution 
which reads in relevant part: 
"No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process 
of law; . . .". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was arraigned before the District Court on one 
count of possession of controlled substance, marihuana, a Third 
Degree Felony. The Defendant entered a plea of Not Guilty to said 
charge and filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence alleging illegal 
search and seizure. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
was denied by the Trial Court. Defendant then entered a 
conditional plea of guilty, as charged, preserving his right to 
Appellate review of the search and seizure issue. This Appeal 
ensued. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
a. On March 19, 1991 police officers appeared at the 
Defendant's home for the purpose of executing a standard search 
warrant. (PHT 3: 7-19). 
b. The officers did not have actual possession of the search 
warrant when they arrived at the Defendant's home. (PHT 13: 17). 
c. The officers exited their vehicles and proceeded in a 
single file line down the sidewalk toward the Defendant's residence 
until they felt that they had been observed by the Defendant, at 
which time they increased their speed and went to secure the 
Defendant, who was standing in his driveway. (PHT 13: 3-7). 
d. As the officers approached the house one group went to 
restrain the Defendant while another group approached the front 
door of the house. (PHT 14: 4). 
e. A detective went into the house immediately upon 
arriving. (PHT 14: 14). 
f. The time interval between arriving at the premises and 
entering the home was "seconds". (PHT 16: 18). 
g. The officers did not knock before they entered the home. 
(MTS 49,50) . 
h. The police never uttered the words search warrant. (MTS 
40: 16). 
i. The prosecution has taken the position that the police 
need only announce their office, i.e. yell "police". The 
prosecution has taken the position that there is no requirement 
that the officers knock, announce, and allow for a reasonable time 
4 
for the occupants to voluntarily admit the officers. (MTS 43). 
j. The detective opened the storm door of the home, stepped 
into the doorway, saw the Defendant's wife and said, "police! 
freeze!". (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress factual allegation number 5, see also MTS. 49 
through 50). 
k. Evidence purporting to be marijuana was found inside the 
home. 
1. The search warrant relevant herein was not a "no knock" 
search warrant. 
m. The Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress on 
or about September 23, 1991. 
n. Defendant entered a Conditional Guilty Plea on or about 
February 7, 1992 thereby preserving his right to appeal the issue 
of illegal search and seizure. (Plea Transcript). 
o. On or about March 27, 1992 the Court sentenced the 
Defendant to serve a term of 9 months in the Salt Lake County Jail 
with credit for 7 days previously served. 
p. This Appeal ensued. 
q. Defendant pled guilty to violation of Title 58-37-
8(1)(A)(4) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), a Third Degree 
Felony. 
r. The Defendant applied for a Certificate of Probable Cause 
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from the District Court raising the identical issue that Defendant 
seeks to raise on appeal here. 
s. The District Court denied Defendant's Application for a 
Certificate of Probable Cause holding the legal issue raised was 
without merit. 
t. The police officers anticipated finding 10 pounds of 
marijuana at the home of Defendant. (MTS. 44:9) 
u. The Trial Court would not allow the Defendant to inquire 
into the issue of exigent circumstances. (MTS. 3:16-5:25) 
v. The prosecution acquiesced in said conduct by the Trial 
Court. (MTS. 3:16-5:25) 
w. The Trial Court made the legal conclusion that actual 
notice [of presence] is the legal requirement [for service?] 
(Judge's ruling on Motion to Suppress, 9:10). 
x. The Trial Court made the legal conclusion that the door 
was open, thereby obviating in part the knock requirement. Id. 
9:13. 
y. It is undisputed that the stormdoor was closed. (MTS. 
48:20-21, 49:11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The police in this matter executed a standard knock and 
announce warrant in a "no knock" fashion in violation of Section 
77-23-10(2). The Magistrate did not authorize such an entry. 
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2. The Court should have granted the Motion to Suppress. 
3. The Trial Court and prosecution cannot attempt to use 
exigent circumstances as an exception to the knock and announce 
requirement due to the fact that the trial Court, with the 
acquiescence and perhaps even encouragement, of the prosecution, 
refused to permit an inquiry by the Defendant into exigent 
circumstances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT WAS ILLEGAL 
The Utah Legislature authorized Magistrates to issue warrants 
authorizing varying degrees of police power with respect to 
execution of search warrants. 
For example, all warrants must be served in the daylight hours 
unless a special finding justifying night time service is made by 
the Magistrate. 77-23-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended). 
As a general rule, an officer may only enter an enclosure 
without notice if the Magistrate makes a special finding regarding 
destruction of evidence or threat of physical harm to the officer. 
The problem of police executing search warrants in an 
unauthorized manner is not new to common law legal systems. In 
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Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 9, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.E. 1603) that court 
"In all cases in which the King is a 
party the sheriff (if the doors be not open) 
may break the party's house, either to arrest 
him, or to do execution of the King's process, 
if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he 
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of 
his coming, and to make the request to open 
the doors." Taken in full from State v. Buck, 
756 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1988). 
The Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah 
provide for freedom from unreasonable searches. The Utah 
Legislature has, through enactment of Section 77-23-10, provided 
guidance to the police authorities regarding what constitutes 
reasonableness regarding the execution of search warrants issued by 
Magistrates. 
Section 77-23-10 makes specific provision for those 
circumstances under which the police can use force (breaking) to 
enter into any . . . building. 
Section 77-23-10 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building . . . the 
officer executing the warrant may use such 
force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority and 
purpose, there is no response or he is not 
admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) . . . the magistrate . . . directs 
the officer need not give notice. . . ." 
The courts have articulated several common sense reasons for 
requiring the police when executing a "knock and announce" warrant 
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to give notice of their authority and purpose and requiring them to 
wait a reasonable time before entering without consent. 
The common sense reasons set forth by the courts are: 
(1) Protection of the privacy interests of the citizenry; 
(2) Prevention of violence and physical injury to the police 
and the occupants; and 
(3) Property damage prevention. 
State v. Buck, 750 P.2d 700, 701, (Ut. 1988). 
Several of the facts involved in this case are worthy of 
special consideration by the court. These facts are: 
The police did not have physical possession of the search 
warrant at the time of the execution of said warrant, having left 
the warrant at the police station. While Utah has not ruled on the 
issue of physical possession of an otherwise valid search warrant, 
a review of the Federal authorities discloses that mere failure of 
the police to have physical possession of an otherwise valid 
warrant is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 
U.S. v. Cooper 421 F. Supp. 804 (1976 U.S.D.C. W.D. Tenn.) and U.S. 
v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (1971 9th Cir.) 
However, while mere failure to possess the warrant does not 
appear to be a per se violation of the Federal or State 
Constitution, this Appellant takes the position that the failure to 
possess the warrant, when combined with other relevant factors, can 
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make an otherwise reasonable search unreasonable. 
The question must arise in the mind of anyone considering the 
facts of this case whether the police would have executed the 
"knock and announce" warrant in a "no knock" fashion if they had 
had actual possession of the warrant and were able to refer to the 
specific terms of the warrant. 
While the police did in fact announce their authority, i.e. 
"Stop, Ringo, police" the announcement of their presence only 
satisfies one of the three statutory criteria set forth in Section 
77-23-10(1). In addition to announcing their authority, the police 
must : 
1. Announce their purpose, e.g. "We're here to execute a 
search warrant", and 
2. Wait a reasonable time for the occupant to voluntarily 
admit the officer. 
The record is replete with uncontroverted testimony by the 
police officers that the words "search warrant" were not uttered by 
the police prior to entry. 
While there is much case law regarding what amounts to a 
reasonable waiting period, that issue is not relevant to this 
inquiry for the reason that the officer's testimony that he entered 
the home immediately (PHT 14:14). Both the statute and the Utah 
Supreme Court decision in State v. Buck, 750 P.2d 700, (Ut. 1988) 
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require that the police officers execute search warrants in a civil 
and dignified manner which is respectful of the rights of the 
citizenry guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions. 
It is clear from the facts that the police did not comply with 
the terms set forth in Section 77-23-10. Furthermore, the police 
did not have actual possession of the search warrant herein, 
leading to the inference that the mis-execution of this warrant is 
directly traceable to the fact that the police did not have the 
specific terms of the warrant in front of them at the time of the 
execution of the search. 
Reasonableness, for search and seizure purposes, is offended 
when the executing officers failed to abide by the order of the 
issuing magistrate and the legislature. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE 
Since the officers1 no-knock entry violated knock and announce 
rules, the most appropriate remedy is the suppression of the 
evidence, United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 292 (10th Cir. 
1980) . 
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1988) supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to suppress the evidence obtained in an 
unauthorized no-knock entry and search. That case did not justify 
suppression because the no-knock occurred when no one was on the 
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premises. However, unlike Buck, this defendant was at home at the 
time of the execution and entry. 
In State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), the 
court stated that a violation of a statute which establishes 
procedure to protect substantive rights cannot be dismissed as 
technical or minuscule and suppression of the evidence gained from 
the challenged search is the is the appropriate remedy. 
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue 
in particular, some jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, have held that no-knock statutes are clearly 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment protections of the sanctity of the 
home. See, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979); 
cert, denied 441 U.S. 965, S.Ct. 2415, 60 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1079); 
State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 (Idaho 1978); People v. Gifford, 782 
P.2d 795 (Colo. 1989); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal . 3d 263, 127 
Cal.Rptr. 699, 545 P.2d 1333 (1976). 
Other courts have not gone as far as a Fourth Amendment claim 
but do state that a knock and announce violation is serious enough 
that all evidence seized during the search must be suppressed, 
Unites States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. amended on other 
grounds, 1985); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 (Idaho 1978); Greven 
v. Super. Ct. of County of Santa Clara, 71 Cal.2d 287, 78 Cal.Rptr. 
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504, 455 P.2d 432 (1969). 
It is clear in the 10th Circuit that knock and announce rules 
encompass substantive rights that rise to a constitutional level. 
Utah Code Ann. Subsection 77-10-3 was enacted to protect those 
rights. According to Rowe, violation of those rights must be 
remedied by suppression. (Taken in part from Brief of Robert Van 
Sciver in case of State v. Thurman, Case No. 910494) 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTION WAIVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE 
THE ISSUE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant in this matter attempted, at the Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, to inquire into the issue of exigent circumstances which 
would justify a departure from the knock and announce requirements 
of Section 77-23-10, Utah Code Annotated. 
As is demonstrated by a review of the Motion to Suppress 
transcript at 44:18-45:13, (partial copy attached hereto as Exhibit 
No. 1) the Trial Court would not allow the Defendant to make 
inquiry into the subject despite the fact that Defendant, through 
counsel, voiced fears that the issue would be raised on appeal by 
the prosecution. 
The Trial Court refused to allow an inquiry into exigent 
circumstances. 
At the Hearing where the Trial Court ruled on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress the evidence, the Trial Court recognized exigent 
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circumstances as a fallback position for the prosecution (TR. dated 
September 6, 1991 4:6-5:25.), attached hereto as Exhibit No. 2. 
The Trial Court, by refusing to allow Defendant to inquire 
into the issue of exigent circumstances has violated the due 
process of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States which guarantees a Hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record it is clear that the police did not 
comply with the statutory requirements governing the execution of 
a standard "knock and announce" search warrant. As a result of 
this violation by the police officers the evidence should be 
suppressed. Furthermore, the State should not be allowed to use 
the doctrine of exigent circumstances to justify an exception to 
the "knock and announce" requirement. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for the following relief: 
1. For an Order ruling that the evidence should have been 
suppressed as a matter of law; 
2. For an Order suppressing from use at trial the evidence 
relevant herein; 
3. In the alternative, should the Court deem exigent 
circumstances relevant, for an Order remanding this matter for such 
further proceedings as are just with regard to the issue of exigent 
14 
circumstances; 
4. For such other and further relief as is just and proper 
under the circumstances. 
DATED th is P 3 d a y of April, 1992. 
ROBERT BREEZE* 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I caused to be hand delivered four (4) copies of the 
foregoing to: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on this ^ day of April, 1992. 
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I will let you explore it briefly, but based upon 
the position the State is taking, I should say it doesn't 
appear relevant. Perhaps it leads to relevant damage. I 
will let you pursue it. 
Q (By Mr. Breeze) What was it that you anticipated 
finding in the house? 
A Marijuana. 
Q And how much marijuana? 
A Ten pounds. 
Q And is there—how long have you worked in the 
narcotics law enforcement? 
A In narcotics? 
Q Yes. 
A In narcotics, three years. 
Q And I assume you have had some training in 
narcotics enforcement, haven't you? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Are you aware of any method that's commonly 
available out there in the world where ten pounds of 
marijuana could be destroyed in less than five seconds? 
MR. LEMCKE: Objection. Relevance. 
THE COURT: What is the purported relevance of 
this, Mr. Breeze? The State is not contending that they 
had exigent circumstances which justified a no-knock 
situation. They're contending, as Mr. Lemcke has pointed 
V> f" T '>"T •*£ A J ^ i 
44 
COMPUTER-aTnpn crm»"~ 
out, and as I understand it, that it simply was not a 
21 no-knock execution of a search warrant. So what is the 
3 relevance of this? 
4\ MR. BREEZE: Well, I am just trying to preserve 
a the record, Your Honor, if this goes up on appeal. And I 
d would just like—I mean if Your Honor doesn't want me to 
7j inquire further, I certainly won't, but I would like to 
know if they—I mean they are claiming that they knocked 
and announced, as required by law, but I don't think that 
101 the facts show that. And, further, if it went up on 
111 appeal, and I just hate to have the Court find some type of 
12 exigent circumstances— 
13 MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, again, the objection was 
14 to relevance of the particular question, which was not only 
19 irrelevant but argumentative to the fact: Do you know of 
Id any way in this world that ten pounds of marijuana can be 
17 destroyed in five seconds? It does not go to the issues 
18 here. 
la THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Next 
2u question, Counsel. 
21 Q (By Mr. Breeze) Did you have any knowledge or 
22 information that at the time that you were going to execute 
23 this search warrant that Mr. Ribe was the type of person 
24 that would have weapons and be a threat, a deadly threat? 
23 A No, I did not. 
45 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
1 not let us do so because you stated that they weren't 
2 claiming exigent circumstances, or in fact, what you 
3 claimed was that they were claiming that this was not a 
4 no-knock service, and that therefore we were not allowed 
5 to 
6 J THE COURT: Well, it seems to me, Mr. Breeze, 
7 I that there are two things contended in Mr. Lemcke's memo, 
8 I and he can certainly correct me if I'm wrong. One is that 
9 J it was not a no-knock situation, because the door was open. 
10 It did not enable anyone to knock. And that further, the 
11 real requirement under the law is that the police announced 
12 their presence, which was done. 
13 But it's my further understanding that their 
14 alternate, or subsidiary position is that exigent 
15 circumstances may warrant a variation on a search warrant, 
16 and that that was present, as well. Therefore I think 
17 their position is that that's a fall-back position, as it 
18 I were. And so to that extent I have considered it, it's 
19 certainly reflected in the memo and in the testimony, as I 
20 recall it, so if you wish to argue that, you certainly may. 
21 MR. BREEZE: The only thing I could say, Your 
22 Honor, is that we wanted to inquire at the motion to 
23 suppress hearing as to whether there were, in fact, exigent 
24 circumstances. We attempted to question the officers in 
25 that regard, and Your Honor would not let us do so, based 
: -JZamemmsstt i I i W ' l ' i sy.aBw x^a--
1 EXHIBIT# /JO• z. 
1 on the facts that you said that Mr., you would not let us 
2 do that. And you said, "Well, I guess Mr. Lemcke's 
3 J objection goes to the fact that he is not contending there 
4 I was a no-knock situation." And Mr. Lemcke concurred in 
5 I that with you, and we were not allowed to even inquire into 
6 J the question of exigent circumstances. 
7 I THE COURT: All right. Well my understanding, 
8 I Mr. Breeze, and again, I've reread the transcript, from not 
9 J only my hearing, but the preliminary hearing, where I was 
10 I not involved, and based upon the request of counsel, I've 
11 I considered both testimony, that there certainly was 
12 J testimony adduced by yourself, and also by Mr. Lemcke, 
13 whether or not there were objections made as to what I 
14 would characterize as exigent circumstances. So to the 
15 J extent that you want to make an argument on that, or any 
16 other point, this would be your opportunity to do so. 
17 MR. BREEZE: Your Honor, what we would like to do 
18 is if exigent circumstances is going to be a factor in your 
19 I decision, then we feel that we're entitled to interrogate 
20 J the officers to find out whether there was exigent 
21 circumstances. I mean when we're told that we can't delve 
2 2 into that area, and Mr. Lemcke concurs in that, and we're 
2 3 not even allowed to- -
24 THE COURT: There isn't going to be an additional 
25 hearing. That's my ruling on that, Mr. Breeze. This has 
